

*Ich liebe ihr noch immer*

*Sie raubt mich heute noch den Sinn usw*

Lexikalische Fehler sind der falsche Gebrauch des Wortes in Verbindung mit anderen. Im Song „Deutschlehrerm“ singt man *doch ich kam zu spät, denn sie war leider schon vergebens* statt des nötigen *vergeben*. Im Satz *ihre Haut weicher wie Samt* muss statt *als* statt *wie* gebraucht werden. Diesen Fehler kann auch zu den grammatischen gehören.

Stilistische Fehler sind der Stilbruch, was einen bestimmten komischen Effekt schafft. So können wir sehen, dass die Fehler sowohl auf bewusster, als auch auf unterbewusster Ebenen entstehen können. Da sie der Norm entgegengesetzt sind, sind sie die Abweichung von dieser Norm und können auf den ersten Blick nicht erklärt werden, aber bei der weiteren Betrachtung können sie rationalisiert werden.

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*V. Vasilenko, A. Ryzhkov*

### THE VISEGRAD GROUP: IS COMMON POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA POSSIBLE AND NECESSARY? *Belgorod State National Research University*

The article is devoted to the Visegrad Group that includes such “new” EU member-states, as Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics. The authors try to reveal a possibility of their consolidated policy towards Russia within the European Union. They come to a conclusion that, despite differences of interests, the common approach is possible in regard to Eastern dimension of ENP and especially on energy security matters, though it will not have a clearly binding character.

The Visegrad Group (V4) was established in 1991 as a group of Central European countries (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and after 1993 the Czech Republic and Slovakia) to achieve the common aims – to overcome the Communist past and enter the Western institutions, that is, first of all NATO and EU. When the V4 countries had become member-states of NATO and EU, there appeared a major question: did it make sense to move forward together and, if yes, in what direction. The Visegrad Group and in principle the whole EU have answered in the affirmative the first part of the question, but, in our opinion, the second one is still a

matter of debate even in 2011, the year of V4's 20th anniversary, despite a number of V4 declarations

The Visegrad Group has undergone definite transformations, and this process is still underway. Since 2000 the socio-cultural dimension has been developing due to establishment of the International Visegrad Fund that sponsors educational and cultural exchange between V4 countries and their neighbours. There are certain achievements in this sphere, and a number of scholars [for example, Dangerfield 2008] stress that it was the Visegrad Group that contributed mostly to the revival of such geopolitical region as "Central Europe", true, a bit modified. Furthermore, in May 2004 V4 countries signed new declaration revising the Visegrad Group priorities after joining the EU – the stress was shifted from internal socio-economic development to external affairs. There have been already some initiatives in the international politics, and V4 has been trying to work out its identity in this sphere.

In Russia, little attention is given now to V4, and there is a feeling that after the integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures the Visegrad Group member-states' cooperation has been reduced to cultural, educational exchanges and cross-border cooperation administered by the International Visegrad Fund. Closer look at the V4 countries' activities does not confirm this assumption. It is possible to reveal that the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Eastern neighbours as such are getting more and more important for the V4 and that the Ukraine is especially relevant as a big neighbouring country with EU and NATO aspirations. For example, V4 was an important forum to discuss a significant project to deepen ENP – Eastern Partnership (EaP) – that was launched in May 2009, and Ukraine is a key country for Eastern Partnership. But, oddly enough, there is no more or less definite common approach to such an important neighbour as Russia.

Meanwhile, there are a number of things uniting the V4 countries in regard to the Russian Federation. For example, their vast energy resources import from Russia, common neighborhood, suspicion arising from the times of the Soviet bloc. But these uniting factors have not yet been translated into the consistent policy for the whole V4. Obviously, it is due to the fact that V4 countries have different priorities concerning their Eastern neighbourhood and Russia in particular. However, there are signs that V4 countries are now well aware that common approach to the Russian Federation is necessary. For instance, it was pointed out in the Czech EU Presidency Program in 2009 that common EU approach is needed. This task is not easy to solve in the whole EU (if at all possible), so, the first attempt could be done within the Visegrad Group.

Many analysts rightly argue that Poland is a real leader of the Visegrad Group first and foremost because of her comprehensive and clear policy towards Eastern neighbours, ability to come up with new policy initiatives and strong regional ambitions. Therefore, the Polish policy is especially relevant and interesting for us.

Of course, it is necessary to consider this matter taking into account peculiarity of V4 cooperation. One of the few Russian scholars of Visegrad Group I. N. Tarasov talks about a 'Visegrad model of international cooperation'. Among its specific features he stresses certain freedom in foreign policy priorities, application

of integration methods of cooperation only where possible, cooperation projects does not necessary concern all the Group member-states, certain cooperation areas are not addressed at the V4 format at all, rather in EU or NATO [Tarasov 2008]

### **The Polish policy towards Russia**

The Polish scholar Lena Kolarska-Bobinska discussing challenges of the Polish foreign policy in 2004 pointed out that the foreign policy-making mechanism would Europeanize and, as a result, there would be less agreement on foreign policy-making and decisions in the country [Sergeev 2006] When we consider Poland's policy towards Russia, it is mostly true The policy towards the Russian Federation was the issue over which it was especially easy to notice conflicting opinions of major decision-makers in foreign policy sphere after 2007, when Donald Tusk has become the Prime Minister of Poland The differences were even among the top officials – between the late President Lech Kaczyński and the Prime Minister But these differences were mostly determined by the fact that the former stressed the Polish sovereignty in the EU and at the same time wanted direct EU involvement in the Polish-Russian disputes, while the latter wanted more Europeanization of the country, but pointed out the necessity to develop bilateral dialogue between Poland and Russia that was to be a certain marker for the EU authorities concerning Poland's ability to settle difficult problems and make contribution to stability in the region Donald Tusk managed to pursue his line despite the opposition from the President So, it is not surprising that the institutions of the Polish-Russian collaboration, that have been created earlier (e.g. Committee on strategy of the Polish-Russian cooperation, Business-Forum, etc.), started to work only after 2007 [Vasilenko 2009], intergovernmental contacts have been also intensified In his interview to US "Foreign Policy" journal the Polish foreign minister Radosław Sikorski mentioned in November 2009 that the Polish-Russian agreements concluded then "could not have been signed before" [Sikorski 2009]

After the notorious events of April 2010 when the President Lech Kaczyński and considerable part of the Polish elite died in the air crash near Smolensk Bronisław Komorowski was elected as his successor He and Donald Tusk are not only members of one party – "Civic Platform", but also adherents of more or less similar policy in the EU and towards Russia At the same time, as Oleg Nemensky states, due to little interest of Komorowski to foreign policy issues Donald Tusk, along with Radosław Sikorski, will become more influential in this sphere [Nemetski [http //russ ru/Mirovaya-povestka](http://russ.ru/Mirovaya-povestka)] That's why the present Poland's Russian policy of "reconciliation" is more consistent, though its opponents are looking forward to the parliamentary elections in late 2011 However, this policy to Russia is more a matter of tactics than strategy

Poland's strategic interest in regard to Russia can be rendered by the Polish expert Marek Menkiszak's words that "Poland would like to see Russia being similar to the EU" Here the Russian political development is especially relevant for Poland It is easy to notice that the political situation in Russia is under close scrutiny of the Polish government, as well as experts and mass media The present political regime in Russia is termed 'soft authoritarianism' [Rogoza 2009] This is,

as before, considered a negative tendency ruling out close cooperation, as well as threatening RP security. Therefore, Poland and Russia can only try to find the areas where cooperation is possible, at the same time RP is willing to use every opportunity to defend its interests, if different from Russia's – on bilateral and especially on EU level. Thus, the room for Polish-Russian cooperation is not big. At the same time, the areas of conflicting interests can be clearly identified – first of all energy security issues (esp. gas supplies) and common neighborhood, not to mention historical disputes that are often used by politicians from both sides.

Meanwhile, the Polish government already prior to RP accession to the EU was determined to become a policy-maker in the EU, not a policy-taker, what was inevitable in the course of the accession negotiations. The only possibility to achieve this goal was “to play an important role in shaping the EU eastern policy” – “one of the Union's strategic objectives” [<http://www.poland.gov.pl>]. The Poland's input was supposed to be the Polish expertise on the region. That's why significance of the Eastern neighbours (Ukraine, Belorussia, Russia and Moldova) for Poland has grown a lot. After 2004 Eastern dimension of the EU neighbourhood policy has become a matter of lively discussion by the Polish think tanks, mass media and government agencies. The Polish government even came up with some successful initiatives, in particular, in EU visa policy (e.g. postponement of visa introduction). To a certain extent, Polish Eastern policy within EU was successful – after a while the country was in principle recognized as a player able to come up with important ideas towards the Eastern neighbours. Tusk's focus on Europeanization brought considerable progress – Poland learnt a lesson how to promote her initiatives at the EU level. The result was an adoption and realization of the Polish-Swedish Eastern Partnership discussed earlier at the V4 level as the EU policy.

However, Poland's policy towards such a neighbour as Russia is the most complicated matter. Here all more significant member-states (France, Germany and UK) have their own agenda in regard to Russia, and Polish opinion is not among the influential ones. However, Donald Tusk's policy of dialogue with Russia is received much more favourably in Brussels, than Kaczyński's uncompromising stand – this is a good ground for Poland's more involvement in the EU Russian policy negotiations. That's why the Polish government during its EU Presidency starting in July 2011 wants to contribute to conclusion of new EU-Russia agreement.

At the same time the Polish approach to policy towards Russia can be rendered by Radosław Sikorski's words: “the more you talk to Russia, the more you should talk to Russia's neighbours, who sometimes feel vulnerable.” [Sikorski 2009]. And here the V4 format proves to be helpful.

#### **V4 countries' priorities towards Russia: energy security and common neighbourhood**

The best way to reveal every V4 country's Russian policy priorities and the differences between the countries in question, as well as a possibility of a common approach is to look closer at the issues that are considered to be V4 major

consolidating factors in regard to Russia – energy security and common neighborhood

*Energy security* Here we focus mainly on gas supplies matters as the most relevant, because this share of Russian fuel exports is bigger to the region and more connected with politics. RP has been active on this issue for quite some time. Poland's "Strategy of National Security" of 2007 stresses among major security threats Russia's use of energy resources factor as a means to discriminate a number of EU and NATO member-states [Strategia 2007], implying that RP is among the discriminated countries. With this in mind, the Polish politicians keep stressing the importance of energy sources and transit routes diversification for the whole EU in order to decrease dependence on Russia, especially on gas import. Poland imports approx. 60% of her gas from Russia [http://www.energy-regulators.eu], while having 30% from her own deposits and developing big projects on shale gas extraction [Pollard www.washingtonpost.com]

The Polish government was not that much concerned about oil import from the Russian Federation, as the crude oil market is more developed – therefore, Poland could find substitute import in case of crisis. Though after the recent developments in North Africa this possibility is not very likely. RP is strongly opposed to the Russian projects on gas transit to Europe that avoid Poland – the South Stream and especially the Nord Stream that was once called by Lech Kaczyński even another "Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact". During the Polish Presidency in the Visegrad Group from June 2008 to June 2009 the energy security issues were high on the agenda in different meetings in V4 and some V4+ formats, and the Polish side was fairly successful in raising its V4 partners concerns on energy matters, as well as in finding support from non-V4 countries [The presidents 2008]. But here we think that Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis in January 2009 that strongly affected Central European countries was somehow more persuasive than Poland's activities.

These two factors influenced the Czech stand on energy security. The Czechs initially were not active on this issue. In fact they depend on Russia a lot in gas supplies (the smallest estimate – 58,8%) [The Czech 2010]. However, up to the time of their EU Presidency in 2009 the energy security has become a priority for the Czechs [Program 2009]. Not surprisingly, the Polish experts gave very positive assessment of the Czechs' action in the European Council on the Nabucco Pipeline which decreases dependence on Russia. At present the Czech leadership even seek direct contacts with Azerbaijan concerning natural gas and oil – in May 2011 the Czech President Vaclav Klaus for the first time visited that country. On the whole there is a consensus on the matter among different political groups in CR, despite political instability in the country.

Until 2009, Hungary and Slovakia have not demonstrated much concern with this matter. Though it does not mean that these two countries can even to a minimum degree consolidate their policies, as there is a serious conflict between them about rights of, correspondently, Hungarian and Slovak minorities. However, in that year these countries' stand on energy matters started to evolve. Slovakia

depends almost completely on gas import from Russia – the biggest percentage in the V4 (98 %) [National 2010]

However, up to the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict of 2009 there was no sign of concern in the Slovak government about this. I N Tarasov examining attitude of different political parties towards Russia in V4 countries reveals the highest level of ‘loyalty’ (understood as favourable attitude) to Russia among the Slovak political elite [Tarasov 2008 144]. But the Slovak Republic was the most affected by the gas conflict in question, that’s why her policy started to drift closer to that of Poland and the Czech Republic. During the year of Slovak V4 Presidency ending in June 2011 the Slovak authorities promoted the question of energy security [Declaration 2011].

Hungary is, in our opinion, the most successful in stressing pragmatism and economy in bilateral relations with the Russian Federation. This country imports approx 55 % of gas from Russia [Hungarian 2010], therefore the gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine lead to anxiety among Hungarians. At the same time the Hungarian government supports the South Stream project. One of the ways to diversification of gas supplies is also through direct contacts with Azerbaijan, as well as shale gas extraction. Thus, now the gap between Hungary, SR and Poland, CR on gas matters is significantly smaller.

Therefore, the external factor (gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine and subsequent instability in their relations over gas matters) and, to a certain degree, Poland’s policy helped V4 come closer on the issue. It has become especially visible in the period of 2009-2011. Thus, energy matters have become a real example of V4 member-states’ sectoral cooperation. The cooperation in this area is closely connected with V4 activities on the EaP realization, as the measures to enhance energy security in the region include close involvement of key EaP partner countries like Ukraine and Moldova (e.g. their membership in the Energy Community). Meanwhile, the situation in the world (instability in North Africa and nuclear crisis in Japan) is likely to result in an increase in gas consumption, including, of course, V4 countries.

*Common neighborhood* Of V4 member-states only Poland has common border with Russia (the Kaliningrad region). This is one of the factors that explain why RP is the most anxious in V4 about relations with Russia. Since 2004, and even earlier, Poland has been stressing the importance of Eastern neighbors for the EU, considering itself a bridge between EU and the Eastern neighborhood. The Polish V4 Presidency was clearly the time when RP strove to promote the Eastern dimension of the ENP, and it had strong support of the Czechs – on the initiative of “Eastern Partnership” (EaP) presented to the EC together with Sweden. RP, being very active in initiating different V4+ formats, organized the first V4+ Russia consultations of MFA experts on EaP in January 2009 in Warsaw. Meanwhile, Poland adds certain military component to V4+ cooperation, which stretches further than EaP [Resolution 2011]. So, there will be a V4 “combat corps” with participation of the Ukrainian military. In fact, up to the recent time other V4 countries have not been very much concerned about Russia as an EU neighbor, and developed their relations with the Russian Federation through bilateral contacts.

However, in recent years the Czechs demonstrate much enthusiasm about working out EU neighborhood and Russian policy. As a Czech expert Elsa Tulmets states, the present Czech approach to the Eastern neighborhood could be to a certain extent prompted by the Polish Eastern policy [Tulmets 2008]. The Czech government even tried to promote its own initiative in regard to Eastern neighbors [Ministerstvo 2008]. They have done much work on promoting the program for Eastern neighborhood in their V4 Presidency, and the Polish government invited the Czechs for consultations about details of the “Eastern Partnership” in October 2008.

On the whole both countries – Poland and the Czech Republic – have ambition to be policy-makers in EU neighborhood policy. Though, RP here is definitely more able due to a number-of-years effort. That’s why the Polish government mostly do not to promote their initiatives in this sphere with the Czechs. The Poles try to make full use of the EU policy-making mechanism. They learned that for an initiative to become a success they need support of an “old” member, and it is better not look like a “new” members initiative. That proved effective in case of “Eastern Partnership”. And the Swedish EU Presidency Programme (in the second half of 2009) specifically mentioned its particular focus on implementation of EaP [Work 2009]. Thus, in spite of common priorities in the sphere it is unlikely to have many joint actions here, RP and CR are rather competitors.

Hungary is also interested in formulating policy towards neighbors, however, different priorities are evident. She demonstrated her interest in the EaP, and on the whole gave her support to the initiative. Hungary does not underline its anti-Russian character, rather stresses her interest in Ukraine, to be more precise, Hungarian minority in that country, as she wants all the ethnic Hungarians to be in the EU. Hungarian V4 Presidency priorities clearly revealed the differences. Back in May 2009 the Hungarian minister of foreign affairs Peter Balazs stressed that there should be a balance between V4 policy towards Western Balkans and Eastern neighbors [Hungary 2009].

At the same time Hungary’s V4 Presidency Programme demonstrated her ambition for V4 policy-making in the East that specifically included fairly detailed V4+ Russia format [Hungarian 2008]. The Hungarian government tried to make use of their relatively good relations with Russia to make a difference. Though this approach did not prove effective in V4, Hungary mostly continued this policy during her EU Presidency. Slovakia’s priorities in regard to the neighborhood are closer to those of Hungary. She has also approved EaP, because has a common border with the Ukraine, and there is a Slovak minority there. At the same time Slovak politicians in V4 meetings tend to underline the Southern dimension, namely Western Balkans [The Presidents 2008]. Up to the recent time the Slovak statesmen were the most involved among V4 countries in consultations with the Russian officials on bilateral relations. The situation does not seem to change soon. The Slovak government keep stressing the bilateral format of their relations with Russia in 2010-2011, though are now more inclined to discuss energy security issues in multilateral format [Slovak 2011].

Meanwhile, the crisis in North Africa undermined the position V4 countries concerning the Eastern dimension of the ENP. The EU policy towards Southern neighbours is being strongly criticized, especially by the most affected member-states, and the EU institutions have been developing a revised version of ENP. V4 countries backed *inter alia* by Germany launched a serious 'counteroffensive' to proposals on downgrading Eastern neighbourhood and in particular transfer of EaP funds to Southern neighbours [Letter to 2011]. One of the Central European countries' major arguments is that this will result in an increase of Russia's influence in the region.

Thus, it is possible to reveal that V4 countries have on the whole similar priorities in energy matters concerning natural gas which is a significant consolidating factor in regard to Russia. The external factor helped the countries in question realize their common interests concerning Eastern neighbourhood. It is worth noting that the first big successful initiative of a "new" EU member-state Poland (together with Sweden) to development of which all the V4 countries contributed – "Eastern Partnership" – in many ways resembles V4 cooperation format. So, it is not surprising that many analysts talked about EaP as an Eastern European Visegrad Group.

At the same time V4 want to be perceived as such and promote their experience to EaP countries. If the EU adopts the policy lessening the role of the Eastern dimension of ENP, V4 countries and first of all Poland undermine their niche of a bridge and interpreter of good EU practices to Eastern neighbours. This can decrease V4 countries' influence not only in the East, but also on other aspects of EU decision-making. That's why Poland who will preside in the EU in the second half of 2011 managed to obtain active V4 support for EaP on the EU level.

### **Conclusions**

Poland, the most active V4 country, and Russia have limited sphere of cooperation. At the same time under the present Polish leadership are inclined to make full use of the existing cooperation opportunities. The conflicting Russian-Polish interests can be clearly identified – first of all energy security and common neighbourhood. These conflicting interests could be the basis for working out among V4 member-states the common approach to Russia and strengthen their influence on EU-Russia relations, because all V4 countries are dependent on Russian energy resources (first of all gas) supplies, though to a different degree, and have their interests in regard to the Eastern neighbours.

Poland has an interest in working out common V4 approach toward Russia that was clearly demonstrated in the time of the Polish Presidency in the Visegrad Group. The gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine and, to a certain degree, Poland's policy helped V4 come closer on the issue. It has become especially visible in the period of 2009-2011.

The "Eastern Partnership" that was initiated by RP together with Sweden for six Eastern neighbors, except Russia, at first demonstrated that there can be a real coalition on the Russian policy rather with Sweden and the Baltic states than with



V4 member-states, the Visegrad Group can be a good forum for preliminary consultations for a serious foreign policy initiative, but not a basis for a coalition in the EU to promote it. However, recent developments in the EU provoked by the crisis in North Africa helped V4 countries realize the significance of EaP for them both in the European Union and in the East, especially in regard to Russia.

Therefore, at present there is a room for consolidated V4 policy towards Russia on EaP and especially on energy security matters, and these countries can influence certain aspects of the EU decision-making concerning Russia. However, it is necessary to remember that the Visegrad Group can hardly be determined as an institutionalized integration group, but rather a regional forum and mechanism of political consultations. The political dialogue is hampered by the conflict between Hungary and Slovakia.

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**A.S. Volkov**

## **RESEARCH METHOD ON PRINT AND ONLINE JOURNALISM TEXTS**

*Russia, Belgorod State University  
soldofasi@mail.ru*

In this paper presented theoretical and methodological approach to determining a quality of journalism texts. Our method mainly based on semiotic conception and theory of text and involves terms and notions of these scientific fields.

Nowadays people have unlimited access to print media, radio, TV, and most recently, worldwide network Internet. The latter media, from semiotic point of view, is similar to every other except it combines TV, radio and newspapers in one system. There is no doubt that modern media construct social paradigm and not only represent the world in their products but directly or indirectly influence society's attitude to it.